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ABSTRACT
The Net Neutrality issue has been at the center of debate
worldwide lately. Some countries have established laws so
that principles of Net Neutrality are respected, the Nether-
lands being the latest country in Europe. Among the ques-
tions that have been discussed in these debates are whether
to allow agreements between service and content providers,
i.e. to allow some preferential treatment by an operator to
traffic from some subset of providers. Our goal in this paper
is to analyze the impact of non neutral pricing and agree-
ments on the Internet users and on the content providers.
Each one of several Internet users have to decide in which
way to split their demand among several content providers.
The cost for an Internet user depends on whether the con-
tent providers have an agreement with the Internet Service
Provider in which the Internet user is connected to. In ad-
dition, the requests coming from users depend on the pref-
erence of the consumer in the different CP. We model the
choice of how to split the demands and the pricing aspects
faced by the content providers as a hierarchical game model
composed of a congestion game at the lower level and a non-
cooperative pricing game at the upper level. We show that
agreement between providers have a positive impact on the
equilibrium performance of the Internet users. We further
show that at equilibrium, the content provider on the con-
trary, does not benefit from the agreement.
1. INTRODUCTION
Network Neutrality is an approach to provide network
access without unfair discrimination between applications,
content or specific source of the traffic. If there are two
applications or services or providers that require the same
network resources and one is offered better quality of service
(delays, speed, etc.) or is cheaper to access, then there is a
discrimination. Although Net neutrality concerns many as-
pects related to discrimination, there is one particular eco-
nomic issue that is at the heart of the conflict over net-
work neutrality: the relation between service and content
providers. Hahn and Wallsten [5] write that net neutral-
ity ”usually means that broadband service providers charge
consumers only once for Internet access, do not favor one
content provider over another, and do not charge content
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providers for sending information over broadband lines to
end users.” This motivated the study in [6]. In this paper
we study the impact of other aspects of non-neutrality that
arises in the relations between service and content providers,
i.e. the possibility that an ISP gives preference or pricing
agreement with a content provider. In some industries, laws
against vertical monopolies are enforced which in some cases
obliged companies to split their activity into separate spe-
cialized companies; this was the case of railways companies
in Europe which were obliged to separate their rail infras-
tructure and the service part of the activity which concerns
public transportation by trains. In contrast, in the telecom
market, the same company may propose both the network-
ing services and content or an ISP and a CP can have a ”pric-
ing agreement”. The aim of this paper is to study the im-
plication of such economic relationships between providers
on the Internet users. Specifically, we try to find a good an-
swer to the next question: Is a ”Pricing agreement” between
an ISP and a CP good for subscribers? We are suggesting
here a new point of view of a ”pricing agreement”. Usu-
ally in a Net Neutrality issue , the problem of agreement or
disagreement between ISP and CP is a vertical foreclosure
(Degradation of traffic) [10]. This type of problem has been
observed in France between Free (a French ISP) and Google
[11]. In our paper, if a CP and an ISP have a ”pricing agree-
ment” then a subsciber of the ISP mentionned above doesn’t
have to pay for the access to this CP’s content as illustrated
in [9].
We introduce a two level hierarchical game where we con-
sider two types of competition. The first one comes from
the subscribers through routing decisions by determining the
sources of the content they download. The interaction oc-
curs through the preference induced by these decisions. The
second type of competition is between the content providers
(CP) through the price they ask for downloading content
from their servers. We first study the general noncoopera-
tive game where each decision maker is modeled as a selfish
player. We assume a two level game based on the prices pro-
posed by the content providers, the subscribers determine
selfishly their demand. In a second approach, we consider
that each service provider can make an agreement with a
content provider, and then the subscribers of this service
provider can have access to contents of this particular con-
tent provider free of charge. We study the impact of this
agreement on the equilibrium of the market.
We show that agreements between providers have a posi-
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tive impact on the equilibrium performance (cost perceived
by users) of the Internet users. We further show that at equi-
librium, on the contrary, the content provider does not ben-
efit from the agreement with the service provider, in terms
of their revenue.
Related works: Ozdaglar and Acemoglu [6], study the
game between subscribers, but in their case subscribers play
a non atomic selfish routing game [7]. In our case we consider
an atomic selfish routing game where a player is modeled as
a source of splittable traffic. After all, in [6] Ozdaglar and
Acemoglu, CPs control both flows and prices, while in our
work CPs control only prices; and each Internet user can de-
termine the source of the traffic that he wishes to download.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present
the general economic model and we describe the hierarchical
game proposed. We study it in section 3 for the general case
without agreements between the providers. In section 4 we
investigate the agreement between each service provider and
one content provider. We compare the cost for an Internet
user and the revenue for a content provider to the general
hierarchal game context in section 5. Finally, in section 6, we
summarize the results that we have obtained in this paper
and we give some perspectives.
2. GENERAL ECONOMIC MODEL
In the actual Internet market, we can find examples of
pricing agreements between CPs and IPSs. For example,
Orange is a French ISP and Deezer is a French music stream-
ing service (a content provider). According to the Financial
Times [9], ”As part of the deal with Deezer, Orange will
make available a special mobile-only tariff for pay-monthly
customers, to avoid the 9.99 standalone cost of Deezers top
package.” Therefore, customers with an Internet subscrip-
tion with Orange will have preferential offer for listening
music in the website deezer (see description in figure 2.1).
Figure 2.1: Example of agreement between an ISP
and a CP.
We consider a general economic model of content distri-
bution over the Internet. We assume that several content
providers, say M , are able to broadcast some contents over
the Internet. The traffic is carried through the network by
high level Internet Service Providers (called ISP) which have
direct links to all CP. Finally, those ISP are connected to lo-
cal ISP, denoted subscribers, which distribute the content to
a mass of end users. We consider in our system M CP and N
ISP. Each subscriber is connected to an ISP and cannot ac-
cess directly any CP. We consider in our study the download
traffic; contents on the Internet are generated from servers
to clients (video-on-demand, movie broadcast, etc). The
source of each content flow is a CP and the corresponding
destination is a set of subscribers.
CP 1 CP 2 CP MCP m
ISP 1 ISP 2 ISP n ISP N……...
……...……...
……...
Request
Subscribers Subscribers Subscribers Subscribers
Content Flow
Figure 2.2: Economic model with service and con-
tent providers.
We consider that each ISP n for n ∈ {1, . . . , N} receives
some demands from its subscriber about an access to some
contents. Requests are sent from each subscriber n to all CP
m. At each CP, any request from a subscriber n (i.e. set of
subscribers connected to ISP n) induces a traffic rate xmn > 0
from a CP m, to the ISP n, which is therefore aggregated
and sent to the subscriber connected to ISP n. We assume
that the total traffic flow from ISP n to its subscriber is φn.
The network is symmetric and the traffic φn is the same for
all subscribers and CP n, i.e. ∀n, φn = φ. This demand φ
is an average value of the total amount of requests that all
ISPs receive. The economic relationships of our model are
described in figure 2.2.
2.1 Congestion game between subscribers
We consider a noncooperative routing game where the
decision of subscriber connected to ISP n, is how to split
his download traffic φ from all the CP, i.e. the decision
variables for subscriber connected to ISP n is the vector
xn = (x
1
n, x
2
n, . . . , x
M
n ). We denote by p
m the charge, per
unit of traffic, that a subscriber has to pay in order to down-
load traffic from CP m. Then, for a traffic quantity xmn , the
subscriber n has to pay xmn p
m to the CP m. We consider
also a preference cost at each CP. Indeed, if we assume that
each CP has the same quality of service, a subscriber prefers
to download his content from the less crowded CP. This cost
depends on the total download traffic generated at each CP
m, that is
∑
n
xmn . Let D
m : R+ 7→ R+ be the preference
cost function at CP m which we assume to be convex and
increasing. The preference cost perceived by a subscriber
connected to ISP n and downloads a traffic xmn from CP m,
is equal to xmn · Dm(
∑
n
xmn ). Then the total cost (content
price + congestion cost) for a subscriber connected to ISP
n is given by:
Cn(xn,x−n,p) =
∑
m
xmn
[
Dm(
∑
n
xmn ) + p
m
]
where xn = {x1n, . . . , xMn } is the decision vector for the sub-
scriber connected to ISP n, x−n is the decision vectors of all
the other subscribers connected to ISP n. p = {p1, . . . , pM}
is the price vector of all the CP. Given this price vector, each
subscriber will minimize his cost function under his demand
constraint:
∀n, min Cn(xn,x−n,p)
s.t.
N∑
m=1
xmn = φ.
We then have a first noncooperative congestion game be-
tween the subscribers, as they interact through the conges-
tion at each CPs, given the prices determined by the con-
tent providers. Therefore we analyse our economic model
considering the routing game depicted in figure 2.3 which
is equivalent to 2.2 We consider therefore, in a second step,
that the CPs choose optimally their tariff pm in order to
optimize their own revenue. This decision will impact the
equilibrium between the subscribers and then we are faced
with a hierarchical structure between the decision makers,
namely the subscribers and the CPs. In order to solve such
hierarchical game, we first study the equilibrium of the sub-
scribers (the followers) for a given decision vector of the
CPs (the leaders). Secondly, we consider this underlying
equilibrium in order to determine the equilibrium between
the CPs.
2.2 Content provider game
The revenue of CP m is defined by:
Π(x, pm, p−m) = pm
∑
n
xmn (p),
where xmn (p) is the equilibrium traffic flow from CP m to
ISP n, pm is the price charged by CP m and p−m is the price
vector of all the other CP. We assume that the decision vari-
able of each CP m is in an interval, i.e. pm ∈ [0, pmax]. The
system is totally symmetric, in the sense that the quantity
of traffic φ is the same for all subscribers n and preference
cost functions do not depend on m, i.e. ∀m, Dm(.) = D().
Based on this symmetry property of the game, we can use
results of [3] and assume the existence of a symmetric equi-
librium for our hierarchical game:
∀m, max
pm
pm
∑
n
xmn (p)
such that ∀n, xmn (p) is an equilibrium for all the subscribers.
First, this symmetric assumption can be justified by the fact
that in a large network, we can approximate the behavior
of many end users with only one user which has the average
characteristics of all the end users. Secondly, this assump-
tion allows us to obtain explicit formulations, described in
the next section, of the equilibrium of our complex hierar-
chical game.
i i i i
1 2 n N
1 2 m M
1 2 m M……………………….
D1(.) D2(.) Dm(.) DM(.)
p1 p1 p1
pm pmp
m p
m
p1
pM
pM
pM
pM
p2
p2 p
2
p2
……………………………..
………………………. ……………………………..
………………………. ……………………………..
Figure 2.3: Equivalent routing game in the case of
non agreement
3. EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
We are faced with a non-cooperative pricing game consid-
ering an underlying congestion game. In order to determine
the equilibrium of this hierarchical game, we first solve the
congestion game between the subscribers (for a fixed price
vector of the CPs). Secondly, we solve the non-cooperative
pricing game between the content providers taking into ac-
count the underlying equilibrium between the subscribers.
We consider linear cost function D(x) = ax as in [6].
Proposition 1. In this game with independent service
providers and content providers, a unique symmetric equi-
librium (xmn , p
m) = (x, p) exists for all (n,m) ∈ {1, . . . , N}×
{1, . . . ,M}, given by:
xmn =
φ
M
and p = (N − 1)φa.
Proof. First let
Ln(xn,x−n,p, λn) =
∑
m
xmn
[
Dm(
∑
n
xmn ) + p
m
]
− λn(
∑
m
xmn − φ)
the Lagrangian function associated to the cost function Cn(·).
We look for a symmetric equilibrium between the CPs, i.e.
for the noncooperative pricing game at the upper layer.
Then we assume that CPs m′ ∈ {1, . . . ,M} − {m} play
q and one CP, say m, plays pm. We want to find some q
where the best reply of CP m against q is q. First, we have
to determine the equilibrium flows between the subscribers,
depending on those prices,i.e. x(pm, q) for all pm and q. We
look for x(pm, q), a solution of the following system:

∂Ln
∂xmn
(xn,x,−n, pm, q, λn) = 0∑
m
xmn = φ, ∀(n,m)
.
This game has a strong symmetric property as all sub-
scribers are interchangeable. Then, we can restrict ourselves
to two strategies x and y where x is a request for CP m′
and y is for CP m. This induces a great simplification in
the analysis of our complex hierarchical game. Figure 3.1
shows the different variables of our system. Thanks to [3],
the previous system is equivalent to the following one:

x
∂D
∂x
(Nx) +D(Nx) + q − λ = 0
y
∂D
∂y
(Ny) +D(Ny) + pm − λ = 0
(M − 1)x+ y = φ.
We denote by x and y a solution of this system. We
consider the linear cost function D(x) = ax and thus we
have to solve the following linear system:

ax+ a(Nx) + q − λ = 0
ay + a(Ny) + pm − λ = 0
(M − 1)x+ y = φ.
If x < 0 (or y < 0) then x = 0 (or y = 0). And if x > φ
(or y > φ) then x = φ (or y = φ).
Let’s now consider the CP m and how it’s going to opti-
mize its revenue, which is the function Rm(pm, q) = pmyN .
Its best reply against all other CPs that play q is given by
pm solution of
∂Rm
∂pm
(pm, q) = 0. We have to find a certain
p which is a solution of
∂Rm
∂pm
(p, p) = 0. We denote this
equilibrium by p. Considering the linear cost function, we
obtain:
p = (N − 1)φa.
If p > pmax then p = pmax. We have a particular interest
in the case where pmax > (N − 1)φa. Then the equilibrium
flow from CP n to ISP m is xmn =
φ
M
.
Considering this result, we are able to determine the cost
for a subscriber and the revenue of a CP at equilibrium. In
fact, this proposition gives the equilibrium prices and the
value of the total traffic generated by each CP at equilib-
rium. Note that, as defined in [2], we also have uniqueness
n m
 n
i
y
x
Follower n
pm q
 n  m
D(.)
D(.)
Figure 3.1: Followers symmetric strategies (help for
the proof)
of this total traffic at equilibrium:
∀m,
∑
n
xmn =
Nφ
M
.
The cost for a subscriber connected to CP n at the equilib-
rium is given by:
Cn(x, p) = φ
2a(N − 1 + N
M
).
The revenue for any CP m is:
Πm(p) =
(N − 1)N
M
φ2a.
4. AGREEMENTSBETWEENSERVICEAND
CONTENT PROVIDERS
We consider now that each ISP n makes an agreement
with a CP. Then, in order to have a symmetric configuration
such as each ISP has an agreement with one CP and vice-
versa, we assume that the number of ISP is equal to the
number of CP, i.e. M = N . In order to simplify, n is the
index of the CP which has an agreement with ISP n. These
agreements imply that the charge pn is equal to 0 for the
traffic generated from the CP n to the ISP n (see the routing
game 4.1). Then, the total cost for the subscriber connected
to ISP n becomes:
Cvn(xn,x−n,p) =
∑
m 6=n
xmn
[
D(
∑
n
xmn ) + p
m
]
+ xnnD(
∑
n
xnn),
where p is the vector (size N − 1) of the prices for all CP
except n. The revenue of the CP m is now:
Πv(pm, p−m) = pm
∑
n 6=m
xmn (p).
Let ynn be the traffic requested by a subscriber connected
to an ISP n from the CP n associated to that ISP. Let ymn ,
with n 6= m, traffic requested by a subscriber connected to
an ISP n from CP m not associated to that ISP.
i i i i
1 2 n N
1 2 m N
1 2 m N……………………….
D1(.) D2(.) Dm(.) DN(.)
p1 p1 p1
pm pmp
m 0
0
pM
pM
0
pM
p2
0 p2
p2
……………………………..
………………………. ……………………………..
………………………. ……………………………..
Figure 4.1: Equivalent routing game with agreement
for M=N
Proposition 2. In the game with an agreement between
each service provider and content provider, it exists for all
(i, n,m) ∈ {1, . . . , I}×{1, . . . , N}2 a symmetric equilibrium
(ymn , y
n
n , p
m) = (z, y, q), which is given by:
q = aφ
(N + 1)
3N − 1
and
z =
φ
N
(
2N − 2
3N − 1), y =
φ
N
(1 +
(N − 1)(N + 1)
3N − 1 ).
Proof. In order to compute an equilibrium for the game
with agreements, we can use the method described previ-
ously.
We consider the following Lagrangian function:
Lvn(xn,x−n,p, λn) =
∑
m 6=n
xmn
[
Dm(
∑
n
xmn ) + p
m
]
+xnn[D(n
n
)xnn]−λn(
∑
m
xmn −φ).
As previously, we assume that CPs m′ ∈ {1, . . . , N}−{m}
play q and the CP m plays pm. Now again there are several
symmetries: we can see that there are two types of sub-
scribers. Each subscriber of each type are interchangeable.
Type 1 is subscribers with an agreement with CP m. Type
2 is subscribers without an agreement with CP m.
The variables of Type 1 subscribers are:
• x is the flow from CP m′,
• y is the flow from CP m.
The variables of Type 2 subscribers are:
• u is the flow from CP m,
• v is the flow from the CP with has an agreement,
• w is the flow from all the other CP except CP m and
CP with the agreement.
All those decision variables are depicted in figure 4.2
 m  n
m
i
 n  m'
 n
i
 m
Follower 
type 1
Follower 
type 2
0 q pm 0
q
y
x
u
v
w
 n  m' m m  n
D(.) D(.) D(.)
D(.) D(.)
Figure 4.2: Followers’ strategies in the case of an
agreement (help for the proof)
Again, thanks to [3], the system is equivalent to the fol-
lowing one with 5 variables (x, y, u, v, w):

x
∂D
∂x
(x+ v + (N − 2)w) +D(x+ v + (N − 2)w) + q − λ1 = 0
v
∂D
∂v
(x+ v + (N − 2)w) +D(x+ v + (N − 2)w)− λ2 = 0
w
∂D
∂w
(x+ v + (N − 2)w) +D(x+ v + (N − 2)w) + q − λ2 = 0
y
∂D
∂y
(y + (N − 1)u) +D(y + (N − 1)u)− λ1 = 0
u
∂D
∂u
(y + (N − 1)u) +D(y + (N − 1)u) + pm − λ2 = 0
(M − 1)x+ y = φ.
(M − 2)w + u+ v = φ
Considering the linear cost function D(x) = ax. We have
to solve the linear system that are given below:

ax+ a(x+ v + (N − 2)w) + q − λ1 = 0
av + a(x+ v + (N − 2)w)− λ2 = 0
aw + a(x+ v + (N − 2)w) + q − λ2 = 0
ay + a(y + (N − 1)u)− λ1 = 0
au+ a(y + (N − 1)u) + pm − λ2 = 0
(M − 1)x+ y = φ.
(M − 2)w + u+ v = φ
We denote x, y, u, v, w the solution of the previous sys-
tem. The revenue of CP m is Rmv (p
m, q) = pm × (N − 1)u.
To compute the equilibrium price we need to find p which
solves
∂Rmv
∂pm
(p, p) = 0. If q > pmax then q = pmax. We have
a particular interest in the case where pmax > aφ
(N+1)
3N−1 .
Equilibrium price is:
q = aφ
(N + 1)
3N − 1
Then the equilibrium flow from CP n to ISP m, n 6= m is
z = φ
N
( 2N−2
3N−1 ), and the equilibrium flow from CP n to ISP n is
y = φ
N
(1 +
(N−1)(N+1)
3N−1 ).
The cost for the subscriber connected to ISP n, at the
equilibrium, is given by:
Cvn(y, z, q) = φ
2a+ 2aφ2(
N − 1
3N − 1)
2(
N + 1
N
).
The reward for CP m at the equilibrium is:
Πvm(q, y, z) = 2aφ
2(
N − 1
3N − 1)
2(
N + 1
N
).
One important remark is that the download traffic from
the privileged CP, y, has a bounded limit of φ
3
when the
number of provider N tends to infinite. In the context with-
out agreements, all the download rates converge to 0. Thus,
it means that by making agreement, each CP has a mini-
mum quantity guarantee of traffic to send. It is an important
result for dimensioning CP network infrastructure. In the
next section, we compare the cost for any subscriber and
the content provider’s revenue depending on the economic
context without or with agreements between providers.
5. COMPARISONS
This paper aimed to study the impact of the agreements
between service and content providers on the cost of the
subscribers and also on the content provider’s revenue. In
the last two sections we have been able to determine ex-
plicitly the equilibrium solutions of the hierarchical game in
the two scenarios. Consequently we have obtained the cost
of the users and the reward of the CP at this equilibrium.
Then, we can compare them to study the impact of those
agreements.
Lemma 3. At equilibrium, the agreement between service
and content providers is good for the subscribers, i.e. for all
subscribers connected to service provider n we have:
Cvn(y, z, q) < Cn(x, p).
Proof. We have the following cost functions to compare:
the cost Cn(x, p) in the architecture without agreements be-
tween providers and Cvn(y, z, q) the cost for the same sub-
scriber in the architecture with agreements. We have ob-
tained the following expressions depending on the parame-
ters of our system:
Cn(x, p) = φ
2aN
and
Cvn(y, z, q) = φ
2a+ 2aφ2(
N − 1
3N − 1)
2(
N + 1
N
).
After some linear algebras (the difference between the costs
are equivalent to a third degree polynom), we obtained that
for all N , a and φ, Cvn(y, z, q) < Cn(x, p).
We first observe that the agreement is beneficial for the
users. Nonetheless, agreement decisions are taken by the
providers such that they take some benefits by doing this. In
a second step, we compare the reward of a content provider
depending on if there is agreement or not in the system. We
get the following result:
Lemma 4. At equilibrium, the agreement between service
and content providers is not beneficial for the content provider,
i.e. for any content provider m we have:
Πvm(q, y, z) < Πm(p, x).
Proof. We have the following expressions of the provider
revenue, first without agreements:
Πm(p, x) = (N − 1)φ2a,
and second, with the agreements:
Πvm(q, y, z) = 2aφ
2(
N − 1
3N − 1)
2(
N + 1
N
).
After some linear algebras and using the result of the previ-
ous lemma, we obtained that for allN , a and φ, Πvm(q, y, z) <
Πm(p, x).
This lemma implies several remarks. First, the agree-
ments should have a positive impact for the service provider.
Usually the subscriber pays the service provider for the ac-
cess, then the agreement implies minimum of traffic from
each CP and thus a service provider has an economic in-
terest to make an agreement with a CP. Second, we can
change our model by assuming that each CP charges c in-
stead of 0 for the traffic to the privileged ISP and q + c to
the other ISP. This change does not bring any modification
in the equilibrium of our hierarchical game and then we can
determine the value c such that the revenue of each CP is
the same with or without an agreement. Therefore, both
the subscribers and the providers will gain by introducing
such agreements in the market.
6. CONCLUSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES
In this paper, we have studied the impact of a pricing
agreement between service and content providers on the
Internet users. We have evaluated this impact by mod-
eling the system with a hierarchical game in which Inter-
net users, called subscribers, split their demand (download
traffic) from several content providers depending on costs.
Those costs depend on the preference (which depends on the
congestion at each CP) and an access price paid to the con-
tent provider. At the upper-layer of the hierarchical game,
the content providers compete through their prices in or-
der to maximize their own revenue. Our first main result
is that introducing agreements between service and content
providers, causes an impact on the cost perceived by the
Internet users. Therefore, it also brings an impact to the
revenue of the content providers. In fact, we have proved
that such agreements have a positive effect for the Internet
users and a negative effect on the content providers. Based
on these interesting results, we can think about several ex-
tensions. First, we can also introduce quality of service con-
trolled by the content provider and/or the service provider.
Second we can do again all our computation in the case of
an elastic demand.
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